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DEMOCRACIES IN DANGER:
THE HIGH COST
OF
GLOBAL TAX LIBERALIZATION
by
John Paul*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Academics have long argued that the collection of tax
revenue lays a foundation for the development of accountable,
democratic and responsive governance. Taxation supports the
relationship between a nation and the citizens and a government
seeking greater tax revenue is likely to face demands from these
citizens for reciprocal services and expanded accountability. 1 As
more and more citizens complain about globalization, 2 it is
sensible to ask why it isn’t working as anticipated for such large
numbers of people and how taxation contributes to this growing
discontent.
Despite the growing academic and public attention, the
understanding of the relationship between globalization,
democracy and taxation in developing nations has remained
limited. Research has provided an increasing but still
fragmented amount of evidence on the specific links between
________________________
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taxation, globalization and governance. 3 This paper seeks to
help fill the gap through an examination of the links between
taxation, globalization and democracies in the developing world.

II.

GLOBALIZATION AND TARIFFS

How would globalization trigger a revenue crisis in a
substantial number of developing nations? The answer lies in
how the governments of the developing nations that joined the
wave of globalization raised their money prior to the 1990s. 4
These governments collected extensive revenues from taxes on
imports and exports. Tariffs on consumer goods produced
domestically on average accounted for 40 percent of all tax
revenues in developing economies and 35 percent in lower,
middle-income economies. Combined, they comprised almost
33 percent of tax revenues in the full sample of developing
economies. 5
Reliance on trade taxes continued through the early
1990s, mainly because they are generally easy to collect. Trade
taxes include import duties, export duties, import monopolies,
export profits, exchange profits and exchange taxes. They can
be monitored and solicited at centralized locations, such as
border areas and don’t require a complex bureaucracy to
manage. 6
Starting in the late 1980s, after the Latin American debt
crisis, there was a growing movement towards opening up
international markets. In order to obtain structural adjustment
packages, nations would have to become members of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), which encouraged the lowering of
tariffs. For many developing nations, this lowering of tariffs led
to a loss of a primary source of tax revenue. 7
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Developing nations now needed to replace almost a third
of their tax revenue with domestic taxes, which are more
difficult to collect. Many had to increase income taxes on
individuals and corporations and implement a value-added tax
(VAT). The VAT involves fees at various level of productions
and can be quite complicated to collect. Broadening income
taxes is even more difficult since a large percentage of
individuals and corporations in poor nations are logistically
difficult to tax. Inefficient bureaucracies, untrained staff and
weak technologies only amplify the problem of domestic tax
collection. Besides, governments feel the pressure to keep
domestic income taxes low so that domestic firms can survive in
the global market competition. All of this can lead to a tax
revenue shock for developing nations with poor revenue streams
to begin with. 8

III.

GLOBALIZATION AND TAX HAVENS

The basic tax problems faced by the governments of
developing nations are similar to those faced by tax collectors
anywhere. Governments want to tax the profits of corporations
and wealthy individuals, while many of these potential taxpayers
want to hide as much of their profits and wealth as possible. The
challenges of taxing global financial transactions are even more
difficult because of the complexity of the global tax system. 9
In a world where capital can flow easily across national
borders, multinational corporations and wealthy individuals find
numerous opportunities to hide their wealth from their own
national governments. Effective global cooperation could
overcome the challenges national governments face in collecting
revenues from multinational corporations and wealthy
individuals but such cooperation has been limited in practice.
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Technically, there is no global tax system. Instead, there is a
network of overlapping national arrangements, principles
endorsed by global organizations, bilateral treaties, international
agreements in addition to custom and practice. The effectiveness
of these arrangements depends on willing compliance, which
changes based on the political environment at the time. 10
The so-called rules governing global taxation have
largely been made by the richer and more powerful nations. This
means that the rules have been broadly designed to benefit their
creators and the powerful interests located within their arenas.
Initial debates about the right to tax focused on the difference
between “residence nations” and “source nations”; that is, where
the corporate entity was owned (residence) and where it sourced
its profits (source). The rules were designed to enhance the
taxing rights of those who were based in the residence nations.
These rules were also applied to the arrangements for taxing
wealthy individuals. Wealthy individuals from both rich and
poor nations began to place their wealth in foreign bank accounts
in order to avoid the reach of their national governments. 11
While international tax rules may be unequal, they
usually do not authorize tax abuse; however, they do create
opportunities for tax abuse. While tax secrecy has always been
around, in the last half century it has been frequently facilitated
by a network of offshore financial centers, more popularly
known as “tax havens.” Tax havens are legal jurisdictions
offering a combination of extreme secrecy, limited regulation
and low tax rates for foreign corporations and individuals. These
tax havens have been achieved with bank secrecy laws designed
to prevent the sharing of information about bank clients with
national authorities. 12
The use of tax havens is basically a beggar-thy-neighbor
strategy. In tax havens, financial institutions achieve economic
gain by offering services to foreign capital and the do so by
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undermining tax laws elsewhere around the globe. The largest
recipients of offshore financial wealth are Switzerland, the
United States, Luxembourg and Singapore. Table 1 reveals the
top 40 nations in the Financial Secrecy Index. 13

Table 1: Top 40 Nations in the Financial Secrecy Index 14
Rank Jurisdiction
Rank Jurisdiction
1
Switzerland
21
Canada
2
USA
22
Macao
3
Cayman Islands
23
United Kingdom
4
Hong Kong
24
Cyprus
5
Singapore
25
France
6
Luxembourg
26
Ireland
7
Germany
27
Kenya
8
Taiwan
28
China
9
United Arab Emirates
29
Russia
10
Guernsey
30
Turkey
11
Lebanon
31
Malaysia
12
Panama
32
India
13
Japan
33
South Korea
14
Netherlands
34
Israel
15
Thailand
35
Austria
16
British Virgin Islands
36
Bermuda
17
Bahrain
37
Saudi Arabia
18
Jersey
38
Liberia
19
Bahamas
38
Marshall Islands
20
Malta
40
Philippines

While it is generally well known that Switzerland is a
major tax haven – and has been for quite some time – not as
many are aware that the USA is ranked second right after
Switzerland when it comes to financial secrecy. In the U.S., the
largest recipient of offshore financial wealth is New York;
however, Delaware is the easiest place globally to create a
secretive corporate entity. It is not surprising that many global
entities will register a secretive corporation with Delaware and
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then deposit their funds in New York banks, where the funds
will be kept secret. 15
It should be noted Switzerland may be the largest
destination for global financial wealth in terms of bank accounts.
A lot of wealth is also transferred to tax havens in the form of
stocks and bonds and tangible assets such as art, jewelry,
precious gems and other luxury goods that are difficult to
track. 16 This makes the loss of potential tax revenue even more
potent.
The numbers associated with the transfer of wealth to tax
havens is large. One research estimate is that $8 trillion of
personal financial wealth is held in tax havens and this number
is considered to be very conservative 17 (Zucman 2014). This
estimate does not include tangible assets such as art, jewelry or
other movable property. Other estimates of total global wealth
held in tax havens are $32 trillion and implies that about 20% of
total global wealth is held in tax havens. 18
Meanwhile, the percentage of total global wealth
transferred to tax havens is higher for Africa. The estimate is that
Africans hold $500 billion in offshore financial wealth, which
amounts to 30% of all financial wealth held by Africans and
once again, this is a conservative estimate. The fact that there is
mounting evidence of massive sums of foreign wealth
transferring into global property markets, often through shell
companies, makes this higher percentage more plausible. 19
So how much tax revenue is lost by African
governments? There are studies that assume that about 80% to
95% of offshore wealth remains unreported to governments,
which means that financial returns such as capital gains,
dividends and interest go untaxed by national governments.
Estimates are that African governments lose about $15 billion to
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$45 billion annually in tax revenues. 20 This has led to a
globalization-induced tax revenue loss.

IV.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE GLOBALIZATIONINDUCED TAX REVENUE LOSS

The globalization-induced tax revenue loss (GTRL)
permanently reduces the revenue supply from longstanding
sources, such as tariffs and income taxes. 21 As expected, the first
big shock for developing nations occurred in the 1990s,
immediately after initial trade reforms and World Trade
Organization accession. On average, trade increased by 24
percent while trade tax revenues fell by 40 percent between 1990
and 2010. 22
This GTRL poses serious challenges for developing
nations. In addition to losing important tax revenue sources,
overall revenue levels in developing nations have always been
suboptimal. They have hovered around 22% of gross domestic
product compared with 33% of developed nations. This has led
developing nations to implement deficit spending policies,
which have decreased the quality of public goods and services. 23
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
estimates that achieving the Sustainable Development Goals
requires developing nations to raise their current tax/gross
domestic product ratios by close to 4 percentage points. 24
Nations such as the Philippines, Nicaragua and India
have made great progress in global market expansion but
minimal improvements in tax revenue. 25 In particular,
undeclared revenue is costing India billions of dollars. The
informal Indian economy is very extensive and paid mostly in
cash; therefore, it is difficult to tax. One report suggests that the
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informal Indian economy is 23 percent of its gross domestic
product for a total of over $270 billion. 26
In order to recover some of the lost tax revenue, India launched
tax amnesty schemes and a widely criticized “demonetization,”
where 500- and 1,000-rupee notes were removed from
circulation with no warning, just to uncover this untaxed
revenue. 27 According to the Indian government, under one
amnesty program, nearly 700,000 people were contacted and
offered immunity if they came forward and paid the appropriate
taxes and penalty. Included among those who came forward
were Mumbai street food vendors who declared almost $7.5
million in untaxed assets. Within 4 months of this amnesty,
64,275 declarations were made according to the Indian finance
minister, Arun Jaitley. This amnesty unearthed $9.5 billion in
undeclared income but this isn’t much considering the size of
the informal Indian economy. 28
Then again, not all developing nations are suffering from
the GTRL. Government revenue levels appear to be rising in a
subset of developing nations that includes China, Tunisia and
Morocco. This group of developing nations show improvements
in trade and total revenue. 29 How are these developing nations
doing this? Recovering from a GTRL requires the successful
generation of domestic tax revenues so how are these developing
nations doing that?

V.

THE CHALLENGE OF DOMESTIC TAX
BARGAINING

The GTRL, which struck the hardest in the 1990s,
requires governments to immediately replenish their domestic
treasuries. If free global trade can’t increase the tax revenues of
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many developing nations, then what can? The answer is
domestic tax reform.
A lot of developing nations have been facing obstacles
substituting their tariff (trade tax) revenues with domestic tax
revenues. On average, low- and lower- middle-income nations
lost 2.83% of gross domestic product in trade tax revenues while
gaining only 2.4% of gross domestic product from domestic tax
revenues. Overall, the marginal increases in domestic taxes in
many developing nations have been unable to offset the loss of
trade tax revenues over time. 30
When it comes to tax revenue policy, today’s developing
nations are facing an entirely different set of circumstances than
their predecessors did. Today’s developed nations faced a
different state of affairs when they abandoned trade taxes in the
19th century. These developed nations had greater latitude to
implement tax reforms both domestically and globally. They
adopted tax reforms in response to their own domestic
calculations, rather than to external pressures from other nations.
Today’s developed nations had strong state capacity, a more
advanced tax bureaucracy and an abundant supply of public
goods; therefore, domestic tax bargaining was more expedient
for them. 31
Another distinction is that today’s developed nations had
strong capacity to tax before they became democracies. In premodern Europe, the powerful authorities imposed and enforced
tax compliance before the establishment of representative
institutions. The authoritarian capacity to tax existed prior to
effective tax bargaining in developed nations. This is different
from today’s developing nations that are trying to democratize
and impose domestic taxes all in the face of inefficient state
capacity. 32
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In political science, a generally accepted premise is that
leaders are incentivized to remain in power. 33 The difference
across regimes depends on how adept leaders are at retaining
power while pursuing goals, such as implementing unpopular
tax reforms in the face of globalization. Democratic leaders
depend on voters. 34 Non-democratic leaders basically need to
satisfy a small group of loyal resource-providers, which they do
with tax breaks and exemptions. Of course, nondemocratic
leaders must also prevent the general population from rebelling
against the needed tax reforms. 35

VI.

THE UNDERMINING OF DEMOCRACY

In general, leaders have two main strategies for
overcoming the public’s resistance to taxes: (1) quasi-voluntary
compliance; and (2) coercion. 36 Taxpayers are more likely to
pay taxes when they are confident in their leaders and believe
that the tax system is fair. The taxpaying public is confident in
their leaders when the leaders deliver their promised benefits
such as solid infrastructure and public goods. Simply put,
taxpayers support higher taxes when they receive competent
government services. It is quasi-voluntary compliance because
the choice to comply is backed up by enforcement and/or the
expectation that others will also comply. 37
When leaders can’t provide competent government
services, the taxpayers are less likely to pay taxes; therefore,
quasi-voluntary compliance becomes more difficult to achieve.
When leaders can’t collect taxes through quasi-voluntary
compliance, they may have to resort to coercion, which
undermines democracy. 38
There are two basic nondemocracies: (1) liberal
authoritarian regimes and (2) conservative authoritarian
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regimes. 39 Dictators in liberal regimes usually coopt opposing
groups by offering some social benefits in exchange for higher
taxes. Dictators in conservative regimes usually don’t cooperate
with the opposition and engage in coercion to prevent
rebellion. 40
When taxpayers feel that a new tax policy is no longer in
their favor, quasi-voluntary compliance unravels. 41 During the
recession of the early 1990s, many governments simultaneously
levied new taxes on businesses. But with more global
competition and tax havens, businesses were well positioned to
demand tax cuts. Businesses with fewer resources in particular
demanded tax decreases in order to stay afloat. 42
When a nation has fewer resources to bargain with,
quasi-voluntary compliance tends to unravel immediately.
During a 2013 nationwide protest in Brazil, 26-year old Jairo
Domingos said, “They don’t invest in education, they don’t
invest in infrastructure, and they keep putting makeup on the city
to show to the world that we can host the World Cup and
Olympics,” referring to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic
Games. “We work four months of the year just to pay taxes and
we get nothing in return.” 43 When citizens have low confidence
in their government, collecting much-needed domestic tax
revenue becomes an extreme challenge.
When a nation needs more tax revenue after a revenue
shock and quasi-voluntary compliance is a challenge, an
alternative means of collecting tax revenue would be through
state coercion. 44 Coercion can be implemented through specific
forms such as passing tax laws by executive decree, harsh
penalties for tax evaders and collectors and even the use of
arbitrary and extreme punishments. 45 For example, tax
collectors have been executed in China for accepting bribes in
exchange for tax evasion. 46
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Empirical analysis suggests that authoritarian nations are
more effective than democratic nations in raising domestic
revenue after trade tax liberalization. 47 Bastiaens and Rudra
(2018) examined the changes in trade tax revenues and domestic
tax revenues in 133 developing nations between 1990 and
2012. 48 The results are summarized in Table 2:

Table 2: Effect of Declining Trade Tax Revenue on
Domestic Tax Revenue 49
Type of Government
Empirical Results
Interpretation
Democracies
Decrease in trade tax
Unsuccessful domestic
revenue leads to
tax revenue reform as
decrease in domestic
citizens resist higher
tax revenue
domestic taxes
Nondemocracies
Decrease in trade tax
Successful domestic tax
revenue leads to
reform generates higher
increase in domestic
tax revenue as
tax revenue
governments overcome
citizens’ resistance to
higher domestic taxes

Compared to democracies, nondemocracies show
consistent improvement in collecting goods and service tax
revenues after trade taxes are liberalized. 50 When trade taxes are
reduced or even eliminated, democracies face an uphill battle
when it comes to replacing the lost trade tax revenues with the
collection of more domestic tax revenues. This can destabilize
democracies, particularly in developing nations. 51
Nondemocracies in developing nations have two
advantages when it comes to governance. One, they can impose
unwanted reform on the population and enforce it by severe
punishment. 52 Two, they don’t need to win the confidence of the
entire population; they only have to win and maintain the
confidence of a small group of loyalists by providing loopholes,
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subsidies or other exceptions to the law. Furthermore,
nondemocracies can buy support from external groups as well.53
Democracies in developing nations are limited in dealing
with taxpayers who resist higher taxes, especially when those
taxpayers don’t believe that the democratic governments will
use the tax money in an effective way. Democratic governments
can’t use fear and coercion to impose tax reform on the
population and catering to internal as well as external elite
groups will only make things worse. 54 When the citizens of
democracies have low confidence in their governments, they are
more likely to rebel against these governments and this rebellion
could range from tax evasion to protesting and ultimately, to the
removal of the democratic leaders. 55

VII.

CONCLUSION

While academics have been arguing that tax revenue is
the foundation for a democratic society, little attention has been
given to how global tax policies affect democracies around the
world. More research is needed to examine how global tax
liberalization affects the domestic tax collection systems in
sovereign nations, particularly those with developing
economies.
Recent research suggests that when trade taxes (tariffs)
are liberalized, nondemocracies do a better job than democracies
do of replacing the lost trade tax revenues with domestic tax
revenues. Since democracies can’t easily coerce the population
into accepting the imposition of more taxes, they may be
undermined by the loss of trade tax revenues, especially when
the population has low confidence in their democratic leaders.
The so-called global tax policies have largely been
created by the richer and more powerful nations so eliminating
global trade taxes favors the wealthier nations at the expense of
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the poorer nations. Before implementing a global tax policy, the
global creators should consider how the policy will affect the
democracies in developing nations. Any global tax policy that
places democracies in danger should not be implemented
because when democracies are in danger, global stability could
wind up in danger as well.
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